Rebuilding Broken Communities: The Rwandan Example and Lessons for Nigeria
Chris M.A. Kwaja, Ph.D.
Senior Lecturer / Researcher
Centre for Peace and Security Studies
Modibbo Adama University of Technology
Yola, Adamawa State, Nigeria.
Abstract:
Rwanda experienced genocide in 1994, which led to the death of nearly one million people and left the economy devastated. The genocide brought in its wake, the collapse of the government and governance framework, humanitarian crisis, dislocated communities, as well as enormous threats to human security and national security. In the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda embarked on the task of rebuilding, with attention placed on reconciliation, justice, disarmament, good governance and development among others. This paper examines the frameworks and mechanisms put in place to rebuild Rwanda as an example of a community that was broken as a result of the genocide. The paper argues that notwithstanding the devastating impact of violent conflicts, war or genocide, as the case may be, Rwanda presents a success story of the transition from hate and genocide to peace and stability, demonstrated by the commitment of a leadership that is driven by a clearly defined vision of governance and development. This argument is anchored on the assumption that rebuilding broken societies as Rwanda’s experience with genocide has shown, was an imperative for recovery, stability and economic development.
Quote:
We cannot turn the clock back neither can we undo the harm caused, but we have the power to determine the future, and to ensure that what happened never happens. President Paul Kagame.
Introduction:
The legacy of colonialism was one that defined the post-colonial Rwandan state and society. This legacy of colonialism played a critical role in shaping the nature, character and structure of the state, as well as inter-group relations. This condition created huge disparities and deepened mistrust and hate among the ethnic groups – Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. 1994 represents a watershed in Africa largely due to two interesting undercurrents- the end of genocide in Rwanda and the liberation of South Africa with the fall of apartheid.
Rwanda experienced genocide in 1994, which led to the death of nearly one million people and left the economy devastated. The genocide brought in its wake, the collapse of the government and governance framework, humanitarian crisis, dislocated communities, as well as enormous threats to human security and national security. In the aftermath of the genocide, Rwanda embarked on the task of rebuilding, with attention placed on reconciliation, justice, disarmament, good governance and development among others.
Located in the Great Lakes region of Africa, Rwanda is a landlocked country with a population that is made up of three ethnic groups. In terms of the spread of these ethnic groups, the Hutu is a majority constitute (80%), followed by the Tutsi (19%), and the Twa (1%) respectively. Prior to the genocide of 1994, one of the key features of state and society in Rwanda was its organisation along lines of ethnicity. This ethnic categorisation defined the extent of control over the military, politics and the economy. The distinction on who is a Tutsi or Hutu was a colonial creation of the 1950s, which was engraved in the heart of the people by the Belgian colonialists.
In the context of this paper, the notion of broken communities, has to do with those communities that are/were severely damaged as represented by the Rwandan experience with genocide, leading to a breakdown of inter-personal or inter-community relations and harmony, dislocation of people from their livelihoods and communities. Notwithstanding the devastating impact of violent conflicts, war or genocide, as the case may be, the Rwandan example presents a success story of the transition from hate and genocide to peace and stability, demonstrated by the commitment of a leadership that is driven by a clearly defined vision of governance and development.
The Construction of a Post-Genocide Rwanda:
In the aftermath of the genocide, the Government of Rwanda in concert with its citizens and the international community, embarked on the task of rebuilding the country. Within the context of Rwanda’s efforts towards rebuilding its broken state and society, the country had to deal with three challenges that were framed by four key factors – security, peace, governance and economic development.
From Ethnic Citizenship to National Citizenship:
From a post-genocide standpoint, the search for a pan-Rwandan psyche that is anchored on the principle of one Rwanda, regardless of ethnicity and religion, constitute a major imperative towards a united, stable and prosperous Rwanda. The pursuit of this policy became the driving force behind the One-Rwanda project of President Paul Kagame. The 2003 Constitution of Rwanda was designed in a way that recognized the country and its people beyond ethnic categorisations. The Constitution provides that “the Rwandan people desire to “…eradicate ethnic, regional and any other form of divisions.” Discriminations along lines of ethnic origin, tribe, clan or colour are prohibited. In a sense the government encouraged all civilians of Rwanda embrace an ethnic identity called “Banyarwanda”, as a unified national of Rwandans.
A new narrative amongst Rwandans today, has to do with the notion of oneness. “We are not Hutus or Tutsis. We are Rwandans”. There is a shared sense of unity in diversity that is deeply entrenched in what can be seen as a national consensus for a peaceful and secured future, rooted in a common and strong sense of national identity. By this singular act, the people of Rwanda constitute of a single national identity that is driven by the philosophy of oneness. All official documents in the country do not bear or reflect any ethnic identity.
Demobilisation and Reintegration:
The Rwandan Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission was established to handle the demobilization and reintegration programme after the genocide, with 54,000 combatants that were drawn from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Hutu-led government’s Armed Forces of Rwanda (FAR), the Rwanda Patriotic Army, which was later named the Rwandan Defense Forces (RPA/RDF), the abacagenzi, a Hutu rebel group in northwest Rwanda, and the “armed groups” (AG), a term used to describe all the Rwandan Hutu rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Waldorf, 2009). Beyond demobilization and reintegration, the focus of the Government of Rwanda in the context of rebuilding or transforming the army and security agencies of the country, was one that focused on putting in place military and security institutions that are nationalistic, professional, accountable and subject to democratic control.
Strong Institutions for Governance and Development:
Both in the private and pubic spaces, strong institutions far outweigh strong men both on form and content. Public sector reforms efforts as initiated and pursued by the Rwandan government is anchored on the premise of a people that are deeply committed to ensuring the institutions work for, rather than against the nation’s interest. The emergence of these institutions underscores the point made by President Barrack Obama of the United States, which has to do with the fact that “Africa needs strong institutions rather than strong men”. The assumption here is that the legitimacy of the state and its institutions are anchored on the philosophy that legitimacy is rooted in citizens that are happy and secured. These can only be achieved or realized through responsible, responsive and accountable institutions.
Two key institutions worthy of mention here are the Rwanda governance board and the Rwanda development board. They serve as think tank and reservoir of knowledge for the country in terms of governance and development. The Rwanda Governance Board (RGB) was established in 2011 as a strategy towards monitoring the delivery of services by both private and public institutions in Rwanda. The RGB is also involved in preserving, protecting and promoting the use of home-grown solutions in Rwanda.
The Rwandan Development Board (RDB) was established in 2009 as a hub for the integration of all government’s Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), responsible for the attraction, retention and facilitation of investment in the national economy of Rwanda. The primary mandate of the RDB has to do with coordinating, spurring and promoting national economic development. It was reported that the RDB’s meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions, resulted in a 24% increase in the number of visitors who enter Rwanda in 2014, with travels and tourism contributing 9.1% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as well as 176,000 jobs.
The Launch of Rwanda’s Global Visa Policy:
Rwanda is fast becoming a shining star and hub for African integration with its new policy allowing Africans entry to Rwanda without a visa. This is based on the simple assumption that there is power in cooperation among Africans as we strive for a stronger continent. Indeed, this is a clear manifestation of the African Renaissance. The no visa policy of the Rwandan government was meant to open up the country for tourism and investments.
In line with the governments’ desire to open up the country for tourism and investment as cover-stones for economic development, a global visa free entry policy was launched by the Government of Rwanda, with take off date of 1st January 2018. Prior to such decision, the government had announced a free visa policy for all citizens of Africa. So far, Rwanda is leading other African countries towards the realization of the African Union goal of no visa restrictions for its citizens. As at 2016, Rwanda was number nine on the open visa ranking in Africa. As pointed out by the Africa Development Bank (AFDB):
Aspiration 2 of the African Union’s Agenda 2063 includes a goal to be a “continent with seamless borders” where “the free movement of people, capital, goods and services will result in significant increases in trade and investments amongst African countries rising to unprecedented levels, and strengthen Africa’s place in global trade.
Inclusion of Women in Governance
The women of Rwanda emerged from the genocide with a common sense of experiences associated with the genocide. Experiences that bothered on deaths, dislocation from their places of abode, loss of relative and friends, rape, sexual torture, and the burden of rebuilding alone, in a country where majority of the men were killed. Hence, a shared experience also came with a shared vision (Wilber, 2011). In the words of Powley (2004:5):
Women who survived the genocide lost husbands, children, relatives, and communities. They endured systematic rape and torture, witnessed unspeakable cruelty, and lost livelihoods and property. In addition to this violence, women faced displacement, family separation, and food insecurity, all of which resulted in post-conflict psychological trauma. Their social structures were destroyed, their relationships and traditional networks were severed, and they were left to head their households and communities.
Attempts by the Government of Rwanda to change this narrative as it relates to the experiences of women laid the foundation for its description as a ‘beacon of hope’ for gender equality in Sub-Saharan Africa (Burnet, 2008). In the aftermath of the genocide, the social inclusion, particularly on affirmative action for women accounted for this. The Rwandan parliament has 64% women, which is the largest in the African continent, this feat is anchored on the principle that the non-involvement of women in decision making processes severely limits their capacity to make a difference, in terms of their ability to influence policy.
Through their involvement in the political and governance process, Rwandan women have been described as leading the rehabilitation of a nation left in tatters after 1994’s horrific genocide. This is also coupled with the fact that they are also holds the world’s highest percentage of female parliamentarians at 56% (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2010). The creation of the Ministry of Gender and Family Promotion (MIGEFPROF) was meant to ensure the implementation and consolidation of all gender related policies, with specific reference to women. Also, the introduction of the triple ballot in 2001 allowed for special ballots for women, thereby guaranteeing their election and participation in governance in the country, without hindrance.
The Pursuit of Transitional Justice and Reconciliation (Gacaca):
Accountability and justice for crimes through a process that was inclusive was put in place under what was known as the gacaca system. This was a transitional justice and reconciliation framework that resonates within the culture of the people. The gacaca system prevailed over the ICTR as a mode of transitional justice because the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was not able to strike the needed and appropriate balance between the local culture and the international tribunal (Westberg, 2010). The success of the Gacaca system was hinged on the fact that both government and the communitie played key roles in the design of the framework, which spelt out its modus operandi. Its victim-centered focus, reflected the shift in emphasis from crime as a violation of laws answerable to the state, to an understanding of crime as harm done to individuals and communities (Umbreit, 1999; Cobban, 2002). In all, the Gacaca clearly prioritised the role of responsibility and accountability in order to stop the culture of impunity in Rwanda (Clapham, 2012). In the words of Sebastian (2010:4):
Because the ICTR was established by a UN Security Council resolution, it can be viewed as an instrument of international criminal justice. And because Gacaca is founded on traditional Rwandan methods, it can be viewed as an instrument of grassroots Rwandan criminal justice.
Also, at the heart of the Rwandan success story is the question of accountability for actions. In the aftermath of the genocide, processes for accountability were put in place with strong political will and commitment by both the leadership and it’s people. For President Paul Kagame, the key to economic development is reconciliation. This philosophy defined the strong commitment of his administration to the reconciliation process as represented by gacaca. The ambitiousness of the gacaca system as a tool for transitional justice led to the creation of 11,000 community courts (Waldorf, 2009:3). In terms of the successes of gacaca, it was reported that:
The establishment of gacaca courts manifested the government tireless efforts to develop a just means and approach that would try more than 100,000 people accused of genocide, war crimes, and related crimes against humanity which were in recorded at the time. The gacaca left behind a legacy of remarkable successes that saw around 2 million trials in a period of 7 years (Rubasha and Bizumuremyi, 2012:3).
Other transformations within the justice sector were undertaken as part of efforts towards ensuring that justice was delivered to victims of the genocide. This led to the establishment of key institutions such as the National Fund for the Support of Genocide survivors (NFSGS), National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC), National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), the Office of the Ombudsman, as well as the National Commission to Fight against Genocide (NCFG) (Rubasha and Bizumuremyi, 2012).
Poverty Reduction Strategy through Vision 2020:
About ten years after the genocide, Rwanda’s poverty reduction strategy yielded positive results. The country became the tenth fastest growing economy in the world, with over a million people lifted out of poverty, coupled with an 8% economic growth and 12% poverty reduction. The implementation of the poverty reduction strategy was focused on inclusiveness of policies, home-grown initiatives, community-based solutions, use of ICT in improving service delivery, adequate institutional and legal framework for policy implementation, as well as improved infrastructure. The realization of the poverty reduction strategy was anchored on the ‘Vision 2020’ philosophy of Rwanda’s realistic focus on becoming a developmental state, which represents the aspiration of the country towards overcoming poverty and fostering unity and reconciliation.
Challenges to a Stronger, Peace and Secured Rwanda:
Despite the appreciable efforts and successes recorded in Rwanda, coupled with the long-term vision of the leadership to reposition the country as one that is secured, peaceful, prosperous and developed, there are recognizable challenges.
State Imposition of a ‘New Identity’:
While this attempt towards crafting a nationalist identity is celebrated, there are concerns that the way and manner the Government of Rwanda is implementing it, seems to portray it as an imposition, rather than one that is allowed to develop progressively among the citizens (Staub, 2014). Notwithstanding these concerns, for the Government of Rwanda, bridging societal divides and creating a common sense of nationhood remain a guiding principle for moving the country and its people forward.
The Fitful Path to Human Rights and Press Freedom:
President Kagame is viewed as one leader that runs his country with a strong authoritative hand, which gives little opportunity for dissent. Press freedom is limited, coupled with the fact that persons within his inner-circle who are critical of his views, policies or actions are targeted. This makes the path to democratic citizenship and the rule of law in Rwanda, a fitful one. In a report by the Human Rights Watch, it was observed that, Civil society in Rwanda is very weak, due to many years of state intimidation and interference, leaving Rwandan human rights organizations largely unable to publicly document violations by state agents’.
Rwanda’s ‘Destabilising’ Role in Congo and Burundi:
The Government of Rwanda under President Kagame has also been accused of supporting a rebel group, the M23 in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The M23 is alleged to have perpetrated heinous crimes that bothered on rapes, recruitment of child soldiers, as well as carrying out summary executions in eastern Congo. A report of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on the situation in Congo, revealed that:
M23 continued to receive support from Rwandan territory. The most consistent forms of support were through recruitment, as mentioned above, and the provision of arms and ammunition, particularly during periods of combat. M23 also received direct troop reinforcement from Rwandan soldiers in August. During the fighting in October, Rwandan tanks fired into the Democratic Republic of the Congo in support of M23 (UNSC, 2014:11).
The political instability in Burundi is also linked to the support opposition groups get from President Kagame of Rwanda. There are reports that some of the refugees currently based in Rwanda were involved in series of armed confrontations in Burundi, with the tactic support of the Rwandan government. The accusation against the Government of Rwanda has to do with the fact that it serves as a rear base for nascent insurgents, bent on destabilizing Burundi.
Recommendations and Lessons for Nigeria and Beyond:
Are there lessons from the Rwandan experience with rebuilding broken societies in the aftermath of genocide? Does the Rwandan experience provide a basis for introspection in terms of how the Nigerian state have fared on rebuilding communities that have experienced or are experiencing conflicts? Certainly, Rwanda presents an important lesson for post-conflict societies and Nigeria in particular.
Re-assert State Control over the Instrument of Coercion.
The starting point for Rwanda’s recovery programme was to reassert the state’s control over the instruments of coercion. Drawing from the experiences associated with the civil war (1967-1970), the maitasine uprising (1980s), insurgency in the Niger Delta (since the late 1990s), communal conflicts in the central Nigerian area (late 1980s to date), as well as Boko Haram (2009 to date). Despite our experiences with these war, violent conflicts and insurgency on a large scale, there has not been any concrete and genuine policy and action on reconciliation, reintegration, disarmament and demobilisation. Increasingly, the Nigerian state is losing its control over the instruments of coercion largely due to the activities of organized criminal groups across the country, with access to SALWs serving as major enablers. Such weakness have in varied ways, formed the basis for the vicious cycle of violence and instability experienced in the country.
Commitment to Recovery from War to Peace:
The design and implementation of a strategy for recovery is central to the transition from conflict to peace and economic growth. The focus here has to do with the restoration of social cohesion and trust, strengthening capacity for law enforcement and order, an integrated community driven development that are rooted in local participation and ownership. As Nigeria confronts forms of security and developmental challenges, there is a sense in which effective responses to these challenges will lay the foundation for sustainable recovery, particularly for those communities and region that have experienced the devastating impact of violent conflicts.
Proactive response to Insecurity and Emergencies:
Rwanda presents a case of states adopting proactive steps towards responding to the challenges of security. The reactive posture of the Nigerian state in addressing emergencies has been a major drawback. For instance, while the Boko Haram insurgency became violent as far back as 2009, the Nigerian government was able to launch its counter terrorism strategy in 2014. So far, the military is involved in the internal security operations in more than twenty states of the federation, all of which are associated with conflicts, insurgency and other acts of criminality that are fueled and sustained by the availability of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). Despite the devastating impact of these crises, there has not been any concrete institutional mechanism or framework for responding to the challenges posed by SALWs in Nigeria.
Design of a Concrete and Realistic Road-Map for Peace:
The role of leadership in mobilisng the people towards an agenda for state-building and peace-building was a defining feature of Rwanda’s post-genocide society. For instance, the Gacaca system became a rallying point for community and national reconciliation, which was similar to the Nelson Mandela’s principle of reconciliation using the Ubuntu philosophy in South Africa. These are examples of national agendas that Nigeria and other countries with similar experiences with conflict can explore and replicate, through the design of a National Peace Strategy (NPS).
Conclusion:
One of the most important lessons from the Rwandan example in the context of rebuilding broken communities lies in the extent to which the Rwandan state was able to build resilience against a relapse to violence. The task of rebuilding broken communities as it occurred in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda represents efforts taken by its leadership on the basis of a clearly defined vision for governance, reconciliation, security and development. Looking ahead, there is no doubt that the much talked about and expected African Renaissance resonates in President Paul Kagame and all Rwandans in view of the huge transformation in the country’s fortunes from pessimism to optimism and finally realism.
In the context of state-society relations in the aftermath of the genocide, the Government of Rwanda demonstrated unwavering commitment in building domestic legitimacy by fulfilling its primary responsibility of providing basic welfare needs of the people. The ability and capacity of the state to deliver on this mandate provided the basis for the legitimacy it enjoyed from the society. In this sense, neither the Rwandan state nor the society was seen to be acting in isolation. Rather, the state derived its legitimacy through a commitment to both pecebuilding and statebuilding.
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