Dr. Chris Kwaja presents at National Assembly Committee on Security, says State Police Imperative, checkmating mercenaries as a major security dilemma and calls for repeal of 1959 Firearms Act”

Former Director General Research, Policy and Documentation to Plateau State Government and Commissioner for Local Government and Chieftancy Affairs, now Senior Lecturer and Researcher with Centre for Peace and Security Studies, Modibbo Adama University of Technology Yola, Adamawa State at the public hearing on “the need to re-energize the military and other security forces to meet up urgent national demand” made presentation to the National Assembly House Committee on Security. He said State Police Imperative, checkmating mercenaries as a major security dilemma and calls for repeal of the 1959 firearms act and the setting up of a national commission on small arms and lights weapons in line with the ECOWAS advisory.

His presentation made available to Viewpoint Nigeria is as shown below:

TOWARDS RE-ENERGISING THE NIGERIAN MILITARY AND
OTHER SECURITY AGENCIES TO MEET URGENT NATIONAL
DEMAND

PRESENTATION AT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PUBLIC
HEARING OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
ABUJA, NIGERIA.

BY
CHRIS, M.A. KWAJA, Ph.D.
SENIOR LECTURER/RESEARCHER
CENTRE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY STUDIES
MODIBBO ADAMA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
YOLA, ADAMAWA STATE
kwajaamc@yahoo.com chris.kwaja@mautech.edu.ng
+234-803-6054165
22ND NOVEMBER, 2017.

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Background/Context:
The fundamental principle of Nigeria’s national security policy is rooted in the
constitutional provision that spells out that “the security and welfare of the
people shall be the primary responsibility of the state”1. The emphasis here has
to do with the absence of fear and threat to the lives of the people, as well as the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country. There is a sense in which
internal security that is hinged on the maintenance of law and order requires
effective and robust synergy among the country’s security sector – the armed
forces, police, intelligence, customs, immigrations among others. There is no
doubt that our security forces have been over stretched as a result of their
involvement in the management of internal security within the country and
Peace Support Operations (PSOs) across the African continent.
The spate and state of insecurity arising from communal conflicts, conflicts
between farmers and herders, banditry and other forms of criminality, as well as
acts of insurgency and terror in the country has been alarming. All these have
been perpetrated through the use of sophisticated weapons (Small Arms and
Light Weapons [SALWs] and Improvised Explosive Devices [IEDs]). The result
has been the wanton killing of innocent people, population displacements,
destruction of property and fractured relationships across ethnic, religious,
political and communal fault-lines.

In the light of the foregoing, this memo, which is at the instance of the House
Committee on Army of the House of Representatives, is sequel to the House of
Representatives Resolution that mandated the Committees on Army, Defence,
Air Force, Interior, Police Affairs and National Security and intelligence to
investigate and determine the pressing needs and gaps in the Nigerian security
and recommend appropriate legislative and budgetary measures to address
them. The memo highlights key security challenges that continue to undermine
the ability and capacity of the security agencies undertake their statutory
mandates of protecting the state and its citizens. Above all, it makes some key
recommendations in terms of how to reposition the security agencies to
effectively and efficiently discharge such duties.
Overview of Key Security Challenges:
The Militarisation of the Internal Security Landscape:
There is a sense in which Nigeria’s national security landscape has witnessed a
huge transformation, defined by over reliance on the military. The reason for the
reliance on the military has been that given the nature and character of the
internal security threats in terms of the frequency and intensity, the use of force
in the way and manner the police is trained to do becomes ineffective, coupled
with the fact that perpetrators of crime and violence often use superior weapons
and tactics. It is in this light that the involvement of the military in internal
security operations has been on the increase, with the military currently present
in over 25 states.
See the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended.

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Policing:
The challenge of policing continue to manifest in varied forms, which are
reflected in the form of:
(i) Centralization of command and control, which often puts State
Governors at collision course with the police at the federal level; and
(ii) Poor funding for the police in terms of welfare, training, equipment
and other logistics, which puts so much burden on the State
Governors.
A former Commissioner of Police in charge of Plateau State underscored the
worrisome state of the police in this manner:
Virtually all the police commands rely on the assistance of the State
Governments for the provision of vehicles, communications and
necessary logistics. I came to Plateau State Command on July 11, 2011, a
state that is facing serious security challenges. No single vehicle has been
given to the Command by the Central Government. Apart from that, a
single litre of fuel has not been given to the Command as well. How does
the Federal Government want the police to perform its statutory duties
under this type of climate? If not the assistance from the State
Government, everything could have collapsed. Therefore, if we want the
problem of insecurity to become something of the past in Nigeria, the
Federal Government must take the issue of internal security serious by
giving the Nigerian Police the attention it deserves2.
In pushing for the overhaul of the police as a precondition for its effectiveness
and efficiency, he argued that:
The ongoing agitation for state police is in order. There is no single
federation in the world, apart from Nigeria where police is controlled by
the Central Government alone. Put differently, having police at all levels of
government is the hallmark of a federal system of government. Even
under the 1963 Republican constitution in Nigeria, there were the Nigeria
Police at the Centre, Native Authority Police in the Northern Region and
Local Government Police in the Southern Nigeria3.
Small Arms and Light Weapons:
The production and proliferation of SALWs in Nigeria constitutes a major
national security threats. In fact, access to these SALWs by unauthorized
persons, particularly non-state actors, reveals a major institutional weakness on
the part of the institutions of the state that are charged with the responsibility of
handling SALWs related matters. This is further heightened by the emergence of
non-state actors, mostly criminal groups who constantly challenge state
monopoly over the control of the instruments of coercion, the absence of reliable
data on the amount of SALWs currently in circulation, the resort by individuals
and community to resort to self help measures in protecting themselves through
See Speech Presented by the Commissioner of Police of Plateau State Command, Mr. Emmanuel
Oladipo Ayeni, during his Pullout/Farewell Parade on December 10th, 2012 at the Rwang Pam
Stadium, Jos, Plateau State.

the acquisition of SALWs among others. Though, a report of the Inter￾Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA),
showed that there are over two million privately owned SALWs in Nigeria4.
Table 1: National and International Laws/Conventions/Protocols on SALWs
in Nigeria:
National Laws Conventions/Protocols Ratified
– The Firearms Act of 1959. – The ECOWAS Convention on SALWs of
2006.
– The United Nations Protocol Against
Illicit Trafficking in Firearms of 2001.
Table 2: Types, Sources and Routes of SALWs into Nigeria5:
Type of SALWs Likely Countries of
Origin/Suppliers
Means /Routes
Pump action guns,
AK-47 guns,
revolvers, self￾loading guns, assault
rifles, pistols, short,
long and double
barrel guns.
Chad, Cameroon, South
Africa, Europe, Niger, Great
Lakes region, Russia, Military
and Police officers, Local
Manufacturers.
Land and sea borders,
creeks and air-strips.
The Privatisation of Security and the Emergence of Private Security Actors:
The privatization of security constitutes one of the clear cases of the shrinking of
state control over the instruments of force. This shrinking of state control has
created the conditions for non-state or private security actors to emerge.
Currently they operate in the form of Private Security Companies (PSCs),
vigilantes, Civilian Joint Task Force, organized hunters, as well as other
community level initiatives. At the state level, there are initiatives put in place by
state governments in response to the weak capacity of the federally controlled
security agencies to respond to some of the security challenges they confront.
There absence of a clearly defined framework for monitoring these actors has far
reaching implications for both the security of the citizens and the country in
general.
Foreign Volunteer Fighters (FVF) or Mercenaries:
The emergence of FVF or mercenaries has further complicated Nigeria’s security
landscape in recent times. The activities of these groups pose serious threats to
human and national security in Nigeria. There is a sense in which the security
agencies do not have a clear-cut strategy for confronting this security dilemma6.
Unfortunately too, these actors were not captured in the National Security
4 See the 2013 GIABA Report – The nexus between Small Arms and Light Weapons and Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa, available at
www.giaba.org/media/f/613_519_GIABA%20SALW%20Nexus-final.pdf
5 See the 2013 GIABA Report – The nexus between Small Arms and Light Weapons and Money
Laundering and Terrorist Financing in West Africa, available at
www.giaba.org/media/f/613_519_GIABA%20SALW%20Nexus-final.pdf 6 Musa, A & Fayemi, J.K (eds) (2000) Mercenaries: An African security dilemma, Pluto Press.

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Strategy of the country. Though, there are no estimates on the number of
Nigerians serving as FVF or mercenaries, the capability for strategic power
projection, strategic intelligence was evidence of the involvement of these
categories of persons from Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, Niger and
Sudan, who fought alongside Boko Haram.
Policy Recommendations:
Strengthen the Mobile Police Force
Nigeria’s national security strategy states that the police is the lead agency when
it comes to internal security7. By design, the mobile police force was established
as an anti-crime force to combat organized crimes, violent militant groups and
other forms of insurrections in the country. It is designated to take over internal
security operations when the police fail. Rather than resorting to the military in
the face of weak capacity of the police, the mobile police force should be
overhauled and repositioned to intervene in aid of the police. Existing gaps
associated with equipment, training and welfare of the personnel should be
given priority.
State Police as an Imperative:
In order to meet its goal of protecting lives and property, the Nigeria Police need
to be unbundled. In this sense, the state states must be able to exercise control
over the police. The National Assembly can work out the mechanism or modality
for its emergence in a way that captures the voices of all stakeholders.
Repeal the Fire Arms Act of 1959 and Establish a National Commission on
Small Arms and Light Weapons:
The National Assembly should review the Firearms Act of 1959 so as to have a
more robust mechanism or policy on SALWs in line with present day realities.
This is in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on SALWs, which
recommended that member states of ECOWAS should establish National
Commissions on SALWs (NATCOM).
Private Security Industry Regulatory Agency:
In the context of Private Security Companies (PSCs), there are deeper issues
around their activities that bother on national security, which required closer
and more thorough monitoring. The present arrangement whereby the Nigerian
Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) monitor their activities is not feasible
and sustainable. In South Africa for instance, the rise of PSCs and their impact on
every security led to the establishment of the Private Security Industry
Regulation Authority (PRISA), as a regulatory institution for PSCs.
Checkmate the activities of Foreign Volunteer Fighters and Mercenaries:
All relevant laws and policies related to Nigeria’s national security should
capture the reality of the existence of FVFs and mercenaries in terms of the
threat they pose to the country’s national security. The absence of a strategy for
checkmating their activities is a major national security risk, if not addressed.
For instance, the Nigeria Immigration Services (NIS) and other security agencies
See National Security Strategy, Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2014.

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should beef up their surveillance capabilities in this respect, with a view to
detecting and tracking the movement of persons and groups with potentials for
such acts.
Conclusion:
There is no doubt that citizens expect the state to perform two critical functions
(provision of welfare and provision of security). In this context, the National
Assembly as a central pillar of democracy has the mandate to make laws that
would serve as vehicles towards the realization of this expectation. Absent
security, the while idea of having a state becomes an illusion in the eyes of the
citizens. For the people to enjoy the dividends of democracy, they must be alive!

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Dr. Chris Kwaja presents at National Assembly Committee on Security, says State Police Imperative, checkmating mercenaries as a major security dilemma and calls for repeal of 1959 Firearms Act”

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- Friday Bako is Certified National Accountant (CNA), Blogger, Social Media Influencer/Strategist, Youth Activist and Advocate for good governance.